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SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First
Amendment*
Ralph Michael Stein**
I. Introduction
I have been involved in first amendment law for about
twenty years. Today, however, is the first time I bring my in-
terest in our fundamental constitutionally protected political
freedoms to the arena of environmental and ecological legal
concerns. There are several possible reasons for my being lag-
gard in recognizing the important and exciting developing in-
terplay between constitutional and environmental law. Per-
haps the simplest and the most truthful reason for my
becoming involved is that, sooner or later, my colleague and
friend Nicholas Robinson dragoons or enlists each of us into
his causes - and my time has finally arrived. If so, I thank
him, for, in preparing for this symposium, I have. become
aware of a nationwide pernicious and unacceptable threat to
the basic right of Americans to peacefully and lawfully engage
in a wide range of social, political, and communal activities.
This threat is aimed at many individuals and groups influenc-
ing public policy, public decision-making, and the develop-
ment of law and is the subject of this symposium: the SLAPP
suit.
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or
SLAPP suits, as they are commonly called, are a growing na-
tionwide phenomenon1 which imperil the protection afforded
* This address was presented during "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation (SLAPPs) - Protecting Property or Intimidating Citizens," the Fall
Colloquium of the Pace University School of Law's Center for Environmental Legal
Studies, co-sponsored by the Environmental Law Committee of the Westchester
County Bar Association, White Plains, New York, October 14, 1989.
** Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
1. See Canan & Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
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by the petition clause of the first amendment to the United
States Constitution.2 These suits also implicate fundamental
freedom guarantees of the various state constitutions.3 My fo-
cus today, however, will be largely on the first amendment.
II. The Constitutional Framework: The Petition Clause
The words of our marvelous first amendment ought to be
before us as we explore the constitutional ramifications of
SLAPP suits: "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."' There, in re-
markably few words, are encapsulated the most seminal rights
of a free people to assemble and to petition the government.
What do these words, penned towards the end of the eight-
eenth century, mean as we experience the closing decade of
the twentieth?
We must start our examination by recognizing the inex-
tricable symbiosis of constitutional rights, public controversy
and debate, and litigation. We must remember that all three
tion: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAW & Soc'v REV. 385
(1988). See also Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 23 (1990); Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (1990).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The basic political, as opposed to religious, freedoms
protected by the first amendment concern free speech, free press, the right to assem-
ble peacefully, and the right to petition. Historically, the right to assemble has been
viewed both as a protection antecedent to the petition clause as well as being a
subordinate right to the petition clause. I suggest that the petition clause right, gen-
erally underdeveloped in American constitutional law, has a strong doctrinal poten-
tial independent of associated first amendment rights and that this is especially so
with regard to analyzing and resolving the SLAPP suit issue.
3. Each state constitution provides specific protection for the rights covered by
the language of the federal Constitution's first amendment. In some instances the
language is identical, in others the wording varies from the federal provision. What is
significant is not the textual language of the states' constitutional provisions but the
possibility of judicial interpretations of textual language to address the problem of
SLAPP suits. See infra 56. The author, who teaches a seminar in state constitutional
law, is exploring approaches to resolving the issues raised in this conference through
creative development of state constitutions.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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factors come under one central, and to me, indisputable head-
ing - politics. The Constitution is politics. Public debate and
controversy are part of politics. Litigation is a form of politi-
cal activity. The suggestion is made, usually by the harmlessly
naive, that litigation and politics, or perhaps law and politics,
are forces each divorced from the other. My guide, still valid
after the passage of scores of years, is de Tocqueville:
"Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does
not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate." 5
Virtually every major issue of contemporary political, and
indeed, often even social life, has taken on a jurisprudential
and juridical dimension, frequently at the center stage apex of
constitutional law. In the United States, issues such as abor-
tion, prayer in the schools, legislative apportionment, sexual
behavior, the death penalty, and a host of pressing political
issues are often resolved, albeit not always well or perma-
nently, through the courts. Environmental law, land use and
development law, and historic preservation law, interests
shared by many attending here today, have been largely ad-
vanced through litigation. It should be no surprise that those
who believe their interests are threatened by community and
citizen activism in these volatile areas of public debate and
controversy would also resort to litigation. Too many of these
suits, the SLAPP suits which bring us together today, re-
present flagrant misuse of the judicial process. Indeed, the
misuse rises in many instances to the studied and cynical ma-
nipulation of the judicial process to intimidate, harass, and
prevent the exercise of first amendment rights.
The petition clause of the first amendment, historically
relatively dormant, offers a basis for defining new and much
needed protection against invidious SLAPP suits.' Before an-
5. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 30 (H. Reeve trans. 1961).
6. The greatest number of first amendment political freedom cases have been
decided under the premises of free speech protection. A large body of free press cases
has also developed. The Supreme Court has seemed to view, incorrectly in my opin-
ion, an inherent sameness and fungibility in the free speech clause and petition
clause. This approach creates problems in the SLAPP suit situation where free
speech principles, as currently developed under that clause, may be both too remote
and too underinclusive to address the issue.
1989]
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alyzing the application of the petition clause and some reme-
dies which may emanate from its sweeping protection, a cau-
tionary note is needed. Not all suits brought by large
corporations, developers, and others against citizens, either in-
dividually or against the organizations to which they belong,
are necessarily properly denominated as SLAPP suits. Devel-
opers have rights. Corporations have rights. These rights can
be and often are violated. Their constitutional and other le-
gally protected rights are in no way inferior to the rights of
those whose causes and commitments we empathize with and
support. Our challenge, as lawyers, law professors, and citizens
concerned about the SLAPP suit epidemic is to devise reme-
dies which do not themselves imperil the constitutional and
legal rights of others. To appeal to the courts for a remedy is,
we must not forget, a most elemental demonstration of the
right to petition.
To determine the scope of protection afforded by the pe-
tition clause, we must first analyze its words in a contempo-
rary context. We should immediately part company from
those who would interpret the reach of the petition clause in
the light of its framers' experiences or those who would limit
its application to late eighteenth century models of petition-
ing. The first amendment's framers were familiar with a fairly
small and in many ways a selectively-enfranchised society in
which issues and grievances were resolved locally and directly.
In parts of the early republic the town meeting was common;
everywhere those who were considered worth listening to had
the ears of those elected. Modern concepts of community ac-
tivism were not foreseen.
The framers may have intended simply that government
was not to prevent people from making known to officials
their complaints and desires nor were they to be sanctioned
for so doing. Lawyers and litigation were both, paradoxically,
fundamentally suspect and heavily employed in the early re-
public. The use, however, of the law was generally reserved for
the resolution of private disputes. Litigation as an intended
and strategic vehicle of social change, or, as in the SLAPP
suits, a device to prevent public activism, was largely un-
known, although de Tocqueville's famous statement was both
[Vol. 7
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss1/14
FIRST AMENDMENT
shrewd observation and acute forecasting of an emerging
phenomenon.7
I will not engage in a lengthy discussion of the original
intent underlying the petition clause except to suggest that,
whatever the experiences of the framers, they understood that
wrongful, that is politically, morally, and legally wrongful,
barriers to access to government by citizens was anathema.
True, the fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights were
intended to be limited in application to the federal govern-
ment, but today most of those protections have been incorpo-
rated through the fourteenth amendment to the states, which
assuredly includes, in its entirety, the first amendment.
I wonder, what would the framers think if they knew not
just of the SLAPP suits brought by developers but of a
SLAPP suit litigated in New York State, in which a local gov-
ernment sued its own citizens for peaceably and lawfully or-
ganizing and lobbying against a government scheme to launch
a bond float?'
III. SLAPP Suits and the Chilling Effect Doctrine
A modern reassessment of the petition clause requires
that we first recognize the central reality underlying suits
which are not brought in good faith either to vindicate the
violation of legal rights or to seek appropriate judicial relief
for harm unlawfully done. Expressed in constitutional law
concepts, the key term describing what is really happening is
"chilling effect." By discussing the SLAPP suits in terms of
their intended goal - paralyzing intimidation - the chilling
effect doctrine allows us to expose and comprehend the enor-
mity of the constitutional violations.
First amendment case law, as opposed to the amendment
itself, does not have a long history, and the history of the chil-
7. This is not to suggest that the result of private litigation did not cause or
influence change, locally or nationally. Many cases caused profound reverberations.
Generally, however, their effect can be divorced from the intent which brought the
underlying controversy before a court.
8. Schultz v. Washington County, 157 A.D.2d 948, 550 N.Y.S.2d 446 (3d Dep't
1990).
1989]
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ling effect doctrine is shorter yet. The chilling effect doctrine
springs from the flood of first amendment litigation during
the period of time which I hope was the late Cold War (before
the Russians traded Red Stars for Golden Arches). During the
late 1940s and the 1950s, the federal government sought ways
to restrict the rights and freedoms of Americans tainted,
rightly or wrongly, with accusations of disloyalty. While indi-
vidual and identified persons could be criminally and other-
wise sanctioned, the government sought to inconvenience and
disable large numbers of potential and actual supporters of
nations, causes, and organizations whose values were deemed
inimical to American values.
Although often acquiescing in and sustaining the imposi-
tion of sanctions against individuals tried and convicted of va-
rious subversive offenses, the Supreme Court increasingly sig-
naled that it would protect the full range of first amendment
rights.' Recognizing that direct prohibition of many undesired
activities would result in Supreme Court invalidation, the gov-
ernment devised schemes which on their face involved dissua-
sion rather than prohibition.
One such scheme was considered by the Supreme Court
in Lamont v. Postmaster General,'° a major chilling effect
case. The government had decided that persons to whom un-
sealed mail was sent from overseas, which was denominated
by the Post Office Department as being communist propa-
ganda, would get their mail after receiving a notice and af-
firmatively requesting that the mail be delivered." The gov-
ernment, perhaps uncharacteristically tongue in cheek,
claimed it was helping many Americans avoid receiving what
the post office officials clearly viewed as a species of junk mail
or worse. The Supreme Court, in striking down the procedure,
found that what government could not do by prohibition, it
could not achieve by unconstitutional intimidation. 2 In a de-
9. See generally Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
10. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
11. Id. at 302.
12. Id. at 306-07.
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cision decidedly reflective of the realist school of constitu-
tional adjudication, the High Court recognized that to put any
price, let alone an unknown price, on the exercise of a first
amendment right, in this instance the right to receive certain
mail, was to effectively chill the citizen in the exercise of her
rights and to prevent the free flow of ideas.
Would such intimidation effectively chill all citizens from
exercising their rights? No, the Court has often answered. In
any situation there are those who for one reason or another
cannot and will not be chilled. The protection of first amend-
ment rights requires that the rights of the most timid, the
most afraid, the least activist-type person must be identified
and secured.
The chilling effect doctrine has been restated and reap-
plied in many cases13 but its bedrock principle has never
changed: the protection constitutionally afforded any one per-
son participating in the political process must protect all, and
the recognition that most citizens are unwilling or unable to
pay a price, actual or potential, for the exercise of their rights
must be factored into the formulation of first amendment law.
That concept applies to all branches of the first amendment
political freedom clauses, including most certainly the petition
clause. 4
In my view, the chilling effect doctrine can and must be
applied in SLAPP suit litigation, and that doctrine provides
13. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989) (the
Court found the removal of an elected official had a pronounced chilling effect on
both the fired official's exercise of his own free speech rights as well as on the mem-
bers who had voted for him).
14. Perhaps almost as much as the first amendment plaintiffs of the Cold War
era, contemporary citizen activists, or at least many of them, are ill-equipped eco-
nomically, socially, and often politically to withstand SLAPP suits. This is especially
true if the litigation is protracted and the alleged violations are many in number and
severe in their claimed harm. Many activists do not necessarily reflect views shared
by many or most of their neighbors and, often, local government may for a variety of
reasons be more sympathetic to SLAPP suit plaintiffs than to defendants. Obviously
the decision to be an activist, or to participate in decision-influencing or shaping ac-
tivities cannot be made with the certainty that no backlash, counter-attack or person-
ally upsetting events will occur. The point is that based on relative interests and
responsibilities, the average community activist is chilling-effect-susceptible, a factor
proven by the comments of a number of speakers at this symposium.
1989]
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the basis for fashioning remedies. Its applicability is fairly
complicated, however, because the context of SLAPP suits
differs markedly from the types of lawsuits in which the doc-
trine was first hammered out.
Virtually all important chilling effect cases featured a cit-
izen, or an organization of citizens, contesting federal, state, or
municipal government action which, it was claimed, impermis-
sibly abridged first amendment rights by direct or amorphous
chilling of the activities of those persons or groups. By con-
trast, SLAPP suits are brought by private parties against pri-
vate parties and, more than occasionally, against government
officials such as town and planning board officers and the bod-
ies on which they serve. The plaintiffs' causes of action, how-
ever, understandably do not raise and identify the underlying
political concerns and motives of the plaintiffs. Thus, they re-
flect alleged grievances phrased in the familiar pleading lan-
guage of common law and statutory causes of action such as
libel and slander, interference with contractual relationship,
interference with economic advantage, infliction of mental dis-
tress, prima facie tort, invasion of privacy, and other torts well
known to courts and counsel.1 5 While the complaints in the
original chilling effect cases often proclaimed and always re-
flected their underlying political context, SLAPP suit com-
plaints appear as just one more lawsuit in a litigious society in
which people seek damages from each other and, perhaps, eq-
15. Perhaps the key factor delineating SLAPP suits. from actions that are easily
termed frivolous, with the consequences attendant upon such a finding, is that the
SLAPP actions effectively masquerade as facially valid lawsuits. A true frivolous ac-
tion often alleges either totally untenable theories of law or ridiculous factual claims,
or both. That is why the frivolous action can often be disposed of through either
demurrer or summary judgment. All of the causes of action listed in the main text,
with the possible exception of prima facie tort, are important reflections of the histor-
ical development of the recognition of, and protection of, private rights, the violation
of which properly calls for a judicial remedy. Prima facie tort, at least in New York, is
judicially a poorly-defined cause of action often invoked by plaintiffs and rarely sus-
tained by trial and appellate courts. Additionally, SLAPP suit plaintiffs sometimes
allege, as against both defendants who are public officials and private-party defend-
ants, the commission of constitutional torts. The end result is that a well-pleaded
SLAPP complaint, reflecting technical skill rather than objective reality, is, at least in
the preliminary stages of litigation, well-protected against allegations that the suit is
frivolous.
[Vol. 7
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uitable relief to prevent ongoing and future harm.
The problem, of course, is that the heightened protection
that is applied when first amendment rights are threatened
requires first and foremost that the first amendment nature of
the case be recognized. A true SLAPP suit is like a British Q-
ship of the First World War: to all appearances on the outside
it seemed an ordinary, even commonplace, vessel, but in real-
ity it masqueraded a powerful armament and agenda. The Q-
ship sank U-boats which were deceived by its false appear-
ance; the SLAPP suit sinks community activists because
judges often do not, or cannot, identify the true colors under
which the SLAPP suit sails the seas of litigation.
The federal government apparently achieved some signifi-
cant degree of chilling effect at the same time that its political
agenda underlying its various programs and regulations was
proclaimed. Now imagine the extent of the chill as citizens be-
come enmeshed in litigation which forces them to answer
complaints which allege injurious conduct on their part which,
if founded in reality, would clearly merit major recovery for
the plaintiffs.
The chill sought and often attained by SLAPP suit plain-
tiffs falls into two levels. In the first, immediate paralysis at
best or distraction at least, is sought so that the SLAPP suit
defendants cannot effectively continue to engage in their peti-
tion clause-related activities. Forcing them to incur big bills
for litigation, to say nothing about the trauma of being sued,
often achieves the desired result. On the second level, long-
term demoralization may be seen, characterized in many in-
stances by cessation of community involvement. Organizations
may lose members or may become effectively dysfunctional or
both. They may even disband. Such a result benefits not only
the SLAPP suit plaintiff but others who at a later date might
have had to interact with and respond to the SLAPP suit-
defeated group.
IV. Defendants' Protections
To bring the SLAPP suit phenomenon under control, it is
essential to recognize that the protection offered by the first
1989]
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amendment against a SLAPP suit is both potentially great
and presently limited. While hardly the most judicially ex-
plored aspect of the first amendment, the petition clause cases
provide valid and relevant doctrines which can rationally and
effectively be applied to contesting identified SLAPP suits.
Indeed, these petition clause cases provide the protectionist
platform on which to construct substantive and procedural
remedies to lessen, if not eliminate, SLAPP suit-caused harm.
Application of the chilling effect doctrine is a case in point.
An important area to examine in SLAPP suit attacks is
the motivation underlying the defendants' actions. While few
SLAPP suits are ever intended to go as far as trial, much less
verdict, SLAPP suit complaints and the publicity which they
generate often reflect the plaintiffs' accusations of bad intent,
bad faith, and bad motivations by the defendants even when
such factors are not necessarily elements of the causes of ac-
tion brought. If the courts can be helped to see that underly-
ing first amendment freedoms, particularly the petition
clause, are implicated in the actions, the Noerr-Pennington1 6
doctrine can be brought into play. In Noerr-Pennington, the
Supreme Court, analyzing and applying the petition clause,
correctly recognized that the protection of the freedom to pe-
tition, in its widest sense, required that actions rather than
motivations determine the legality of a challenged act.
If a court recognizes that as a matter of law, defendants
in a lawsuit are engaged in a constitutionally protected activ-
ity, it does not nor should it, lead automatically to their being
exculpated from liability. Noerr-Pennington, however, would
result in a finding that once a protected activity is involved,
liability depends solely on the illegality of the acts themselves,
and the aims and motivations underlying the challenged acts
are of no legal consequence. Stated in other words, Noerr-
Pennington, when invoked, takes much of the wind out of a
plaintiff's sails because he is then forced to do just what most
SLAPP suit plaintiffs cannot do - prove the illegality or tor-
tious nature of his opponent's behavior without relying on the
16. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127
(1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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bolstering quality of bad motive attacks.
It would seem that Noerr-Pennington can provide much
of the protection SLAPP suit defendants need. But if you
have been keeping your eye on the SLAPP ball, you will re-
member one important reality - virtually always, the SLAPP
plaintiff has no desire to allow the litigation to proceed to the
point where Noerr-Pennington, or any other speech and peti-
tion-protectionist doctrine can be applied. Where plaintiffs
with legitimate causes of action chafe at long court calendars
and delays, the SLAPP suit plaintiff plays by different rules.
In the world of in terrorem litigation, the operative rule is -
keep the other guy out in the field as long as you can, long
enough to intimidate him, but don't let him get to bat.
So we have a problem. We have the potentially broad, but
insufficiently developed, unavailable umbrella protection of
Noerr-Pennington without the opportunity of having it ap-
plied often in SLAPP suits.
Actually, the problem is even more invidious since too
often the threat, rather than the institution of litigation
achieves the desired result of intimidation and surrender.
I would like to raise for comment and further discussion
some solutions to protect petition clause freedoms in cases
that never will, indeed never should go to trial. As a prelimi-
nary comment, please accept the following. First, protection
for SLAPP suit victims cannot be at the expense of the rights
of anyone seeking redress in the courts for judicially cogniza-
ble harms. Whatever your feelings are about the relative mer-
its of typical SLAPP suit adversaries, and I know feelings run
high among this group today, constitutional rights can never
truly be strengthened for one group by weakening the rights
of another. Second, there is no, and there can be no, "magic
bullet" cure for SLAPP suits. A host of responses, judicial,
legislative, and citizen, will take the terror out of many of
these actions. Perhaps these responses will make SLAPP suits
less profitable to pursue, but achieving goals - good or bad
- through actual or threatened litigation, is as American as
apple pie and is likely to remain so.
At the doctrinal level, do not look to the United States
Supreme Court for a judicial response to the SLAPP suit
1989]
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right now. Existing constitutional doctrine favors SLAPP suit
defendants, and for many reasons SLAPP suits are less likely
to come before the Court than other first amendment issues.
In any event, I freely admit to a fear of pressing this Court
with SLAPP suit issues. I simply do not trust what I perceive
as the current majority bloc on the bench. I would prefer to
live with the doctrine we now have and try to have it applied
more expeditiously and correctly, rather than risk reversals or
new limitations on petition clause concepts.
I do suggest, however, that whenever and wherever feasi-
ble, SLAPP suit issues be taken before the highest courts of
the states for adjudication based on protections afforded by
state constitutions. State constitutional law is one of the most
exciting areas of law in the United States and the use of the
states' highest laws to shape and protect individual freedoms
beyond the level afforded by the federal Constitution provides
real opportunities. There is as much opportunity for such doc-
trinal development in SLAPP suits as in any other issue.
Since many SLAPP suits raise issues on which, at the state
level, interlocutory appeals may be taken, a body of state peti-
tion clause-protected law may emerge where a corollary devel-
opment under federal law would be difficult if not impossible
to achieve.
Note also that our states' high courts are actively in-
volved in environmental, land use, and historic preservation
issues. State appellate courts may well be able to make the
connection between SLAPP suits and the true public partici-
pation issues in which they are enmeshed more quickly and
effectively than their federal counterparts.
Either by court rule or by statute, the expeditious han-
dling of cases where first amendment rights, or their state
constitution equivalent are identified, is the single most im-
portant defendants' remedy to limit the harm of SLAPP suits.
A process must develop whereby a defendant in a SLAPP suit
can move for expedited calendaring of the case by alleging the
constitutional nature of the activities deemed injurious in the
seemingly ordinary tort case. Certainly, this cannot be ex
parte and the plaintiff must be afforded an opportunity to re-
spond. The issue of the constitutional implications must, of
[Vol. 7
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course, be a question of law for the court. Upon finding that a
constitutionally protected right was involved, a proper and
practical procedure would mandate moving the case ahead of
all cases except for criminal cases receiving preference because
of the "speedy trial" mandate. Such a process would scuttle
most real SLAPP suits because the last thing the plaintiff
wants is an expedited trial. Costs to the defendant, who is al-
most always financially less secure than the plaintiff, would be
lessened and one of the real burdens, and intimidating factors,
of SLAPP suits will have been lessened.
A plaintiff with a genuine and well-founded cause of ac-
tion will not be dealt with unfairly under the process I have
just described, since such a party would presumably be happy
to have an early chance at proving his case. Such a plaintiff
would also benefit from increased pressure on the defendant
to settle, if, after securing an expedited proceeding, the de-
fendant determined or was forced to recognize that she was
really at fault legally.
Countersuits are believed by some students of SLAPP
suits to be a viable means of, as some have put it, "SLAPPing
back." While I recognize that some SLAPP suit defendants
have received high verdicts in counterclaims, although many
of these verdicts appear to be on appeal now, I do not believe
that countersuits, or "SLAPP-Backs," are a good route to try
to control the SLAPP suit phenomenon. For one thing, know-
ing that a suit is a SLAPP suit and proving that it was mali-
ciously initiated are two different things. Merely prevailing
does not provide the SLAPP suit defendant with a firm and
colorable basis for a countersuit, especially when as is so often
the case, the victim prevails because the suit is not prosecuted
or is withdrawn rather than won at trial by the defendant.
Countersuits also involve people in time-consuming, un-
certain, and both financially and emotionally draining litiga-
tion. In the case of community groups, such litigation can oc-
cupy members' time to the detriment of pursuing the
purposes which caused them to unite in the first place. While
in individual cases, countersuits may be advisable, in general
they are no panacea for the problem.
Sanctions, whether imposed on counsel, parties, or both,
19891
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are major subjects of discussion today. Indeed, sanctions have
been imposed in SLAPP suits. This, however, is at best a pe-
ripheral approach which has little effect on the main problem.
Currently, sanction awards are limited by statute in most ju-
risdictions and the SLAPP suit plaintiffs can easily pay these
amounts, including sanctions imposed on their attorneys, as
part of the cost of doing business. In any event, few SLAPP
suits are so facially out-of-line that the attorney is in serious
danger of being sanctioned for bringing the action.
I do believe that attorney's fees, a frightening prospect
for most SLAPP suit victims, should be paid by the plaintiff
when a suit is found to lack merit and is also found to
threaten first amendment or state equivalent protections.
This would run counter to the prevailing American Rule 17
that each party pays for her own lawyer, but there are many
exceptions and a statutory exception for petition clause impli-
cated litigation may cause some SLAPP suit plaintiffs to
think twice about vigorously pursuing bad claims.
V. Concluding Remarks
Exploration of responses to SLAPP suits is really just be-
ginning and today's symposium allows for a fruitful exchange
of ideas. I do suggest that the most important starting point
for all those concerned with SLAPP suits is the understanding
that the activities threatened by these suits are meant to be,
and must be, protected as fundamentally guaranteed constitu-
tional rights which are central to our conception of freedom.
The broad language of the first amendment was intended, as
was much of the Constitution, to establish bedrock precepts
relevant to all ages. As the framers understood the importance
of public participation in the context of the issues they de-
bated, so must we recognize that community planning, envi-
ronmental protection, land use, and historic preservation are
some of our late twentieth century concerns which demand
the highest degree of first amendment and state constitutional
protection. The petition clause gives us rights which cannot be
17. 0. DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.8, at 194 (1973).
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usurped by the arrogant and improper employment of the
very laws created to assure a free and civil society. All of us
must be involved not only in pressing the issues we care about
in our communities but in never ceasing to demand the full
measure of constitutional protection and freedom we deserve.
15
